In recent years, some central banks have implemented monetary policy without reserve requirements by using a ceiling and floor for overnight interest rates established by central bank lending and deposit facilities. This paper analyzes a theoretical model of such a "tunnel" system and the benefits of adding reserve requirements to it. However, reserve requirements may involve social costs owing to the reserve avoidance activities of banks. The paper also presents a modified model with no reserve avoidance, where banks optimally choose to hold voluntary reserve requirements. The paper highlights the importance for central banks to consider such models in light of idiosyncratic features of their own institutional environment, which may importantly condition the advisability of any particular approach.
Introduction
Most major central banks conduct monetary policy using a short-term market interest rate as an instrument to achieve their ultimate objectives for the performance of the economy.
Traditionally, central banks have tried to hit a target level of the short-term market rate by adjusting the aggregate supply of liquidity through open market operations or other means.
In such circumstances, the central bank needs a predictable demand function for the liquidity it supplies. Reserve requirements have been one means of arranging for this, and they are still used for this purpose by some major central banks, including the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and the Bank of Japan.
Reserve requirements create a known or predictable demand for balances held at a central bank on average over a maintenance period. Moreover, the period-averaging induces depository institutions to engage in intertemporal arbitrage of the reserve market interest rate, helping to keep it on target. However, central banks in Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have found that they can conduct monetary policy satisfactorily without the aid of reserve requirements. The Bank of England retains a minimal level of reserve requirements, though merely to raise revenue for the central bank independently of the government budget and not for the purpose of implementing monetary policy. Clinton (1997) , Guthrie and Wright (2000) , and Woodford (2001) have described how a central bank can keep a policy rate on target, without reserve requirements, by relying on standing facilities: a lending facility at a penalty interest rate above the central bank's target rate and a deposit facility (or interest on excess balances held at the central bank) at an interest rate below the target rate. With the lending facility providing a ceiling for overnight rates and the deposit facility a floor, such a system has been called a channel, corridor, or tunnel. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand currently employ a tunnel regime with a 50 basis point band between lending and deposit rates.
This paper analyzes further the use of tunnel procedures and any role for periodaverage requirements in such a regime. The models of bank reserve management developed here draw from and contribute to a sizable literature, including work by Orr and Mellon (1961) , Poole (1968) , Campbell (1987) , Kopecky and Tucker (1993) , Clouse and Dow (1999) , Furfine (2000) , Guthrie and Wright (2000) , Bindseil (2000) , Woodford (2001) , Bartolini/Bertola/Prati (2001 and , and Heller and Lengwiler (2003) .
1 With a few exceptions, this literature has not addressed daily account overdrafts in the presence of multiday reserve requirements with uncertain future interest rates, and closed form solutions for such models have not previously appeared to the author's knowledge. 2 This paper derives the full shape of the reserve demand curve, which is critically important for the implementation of monetary policy, as discussed further below. The paper also includes what is evidently the first formal model of voluntary reserve requirements.
The paper begins by analyzing a one-day tunnel model without reserve requirements, similar to one discussed briefly by Woodford (2001) , and identifies the advantages of such a framework for estimating reserve demand, an essential activity in monetary policy implementation. Assuming Gaussian distributions for reserve supply and account balance uncertainties, the resulting distributions for market interest rates are then depicted. A key disadvantage of a pure tunnel regime related to the elasticity of demand is also identified.
A multi-day tunnel model is then developed and the effects of reserve requirements on the elasticity of demand are examined. While the tunnel framework may help the central bank hit its desired interest rate on settlement day, reserve requirements and expected future interest rates importantly shape the reserve demand curve earlier in a maintenance period.
The paper points out the sensitivity of the key findings to detailed features of the relationship of private sector banks to the monetary authority. Seemingly minor modifications in institutional arrangements, such as whether overdrafts count toward reserve requirements, may change the structure of incentives profoundly and alter the behavior of the system.
The last section of the paper addresses a well-known trade-off associated with reserve requirements: While they may help reduce the variance of overnight interest rates, they may 1 Models of the micro-mechanics of trading in federal funds have also contributed to this literature, including those of Ho and Saunders (1985) and Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) . 2 Furfine (2000) set up such a problem and showed intertemporal Euler conditions without deriving demand curves. Longworth (1989) and Davies (1998) also allowed for overnight overdrafts with period-average requirements, but in different types of models. Longworth assumed perfect foresight about future interest rates and Davies allowed no interbank trading, while both used a uniform distribution for account shocks, rather than the general or Gaussian distribution functions used here. Clouse and Dow (2001) find numerical solutions for a multi-period model with overdrafts and period-average requirements assuming a constant, known market interest rate.
also generate incentives for reserve avoidance activities that impair financial sector efficiency and that cannot be justified on optimal taxation grounds. The paper concludes with a stylized model that depicts circumstances in which the inefficiencies could be avoided through a system of voluntary reserve requirements.
A One-Day Tunnel Model
In this section, we present a one-day tunnel model without reserve requirements and then provide motivation for examining a multi-day tunnel model with reserve requirements.
In the one-day model, the central bank relies entirely on the ceiling and floor provided by its lending and deposit interest rates, respectively, to control the overnight market interest rate.
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To motivate the setup, consider a private sector bank with no previous involvement in overnight markets that decides to engage in direct clearing of transactions through the payment system operated by or in association with the central bank. The private bank opens an account at the central bank and begins using the account to clear transactions. 4 The bank tries to track its account position with the central bank during the day, but is nevertheless subject to unexpected late payments or delayed accounting information, and therefore can determine its end-of-day position only within a margin of error given by a stochastic term, e, where E(e) = 0. During the day, the bank can trade central bank balances with other banks at the market rate, i, and does so to achieve a target account balance of T. If the bank's actual end-of-day account balance of T + e is positive, it earns interest at the central bank's deposit interest rate. Any end-of-day overdraft is booked as a loan from the central bank.
The central bank has a target for the overnight rate of i*, which it tries to hit with the help of a lending rate at i* + s and a deposit rate of i* -s. The symmetry of these spreads around i* will be an important feature of the model. A graphic depiction of the representative bank's decision problem is provided in Exhibit 1. More formally, the key assumptions are:
3 A similar one-day tunnel model was discussed briefly by Woodford (2001) . The analysis here is more thorough and the subsequent models, which include reserve requirements, are new contributions. Though not tunnel frameworks, the models of Furfine (2000) and Bartolini/Bertola/Prati (2002) are also similar in some respects to the one developed here. 4 At the Federal Reserve, such transactions include checks, automated clearinghouse payments, wire transfers, and transfers for cash of book-entry Treasury and agency securities. The paper uses the term "private bank" to represent any institution that may open a central bank account and participate in the payment system supported by the central bank.
Exhibit 1: THE REPRESENTATIVE BANK'S PROBLEM Cost Note: The bank chooses the amount T to borrow (or withhold) from the market at interest rate i.
After an account shock, its end-of-day balance at the central bank is T + ε. It earns i* -s on any positive balances or pays i* + s on any account overdraft. With full information, as long as i* -s < i < i* + s, the bank chooses T = -ε and its cost is -iε. But knowing only the distribution of ε, it chooses T to minimize the expected opportunity costs given by the probability-weighted vertical distances between the dotted and solid lines on the left.
-T 0 If the bank had full information, it would set T = -e, given i*-s < i < i*+s. Then its end-of-day balance at the central bank would be zero and its net funding cost would be minimized at -ie. Without knowing e, the bank chooses T to minimize two types of expected costs: the opportunity cost of holding a positive balance in its account at the central bank, relative to lending funds in the market, given by i -(i* -s), and the loss, in the case of overdrafts, on borrowing from the central bank rather than from the market, given by i* + s -i. Formally, the bank's problem is:
Distribution of Account Shock
The first order condition may be written in the form:
where T* is the optimal choice. ( )
with n( ) denoting the standard normal density. The ceiling and floor properties emerge:
As the overnight rate approaches the central bank's deposit rate (i ® i* -s), equation [2] indicates that T* ® ¥ and [3] reveals that the demand curve flattens out. The elasticity also becomes infinite as the overnight rate approaches the central bank's lending rate of i* + s and T* ® -¥ . The responsiveness of target balances to the spread can be written as:
A wider spread of lending and deposit rates around the central bank's desired interest rate the end-of-day account balance. 5 In both cases, the vertical intercept, midway between the central bank's deposit and lending interest rates, is a pivot point. These results highlight the importance for the central bank to set a policy target at an interest rate that equalizes the opportunity costs of overdrafts and excess balances. The account uncertainty perceived by the private bank, σ, would vary across banks and over time for the same bank. As individual bank account uncertainty and the mix of banks in the market varied from day to day, the shape of the aggregate reserve demand curve would change. Nevertheless, if the central bank set its desired interest rate at the midpoint between its deposit and lending rates, the aggregate quantity of nonborrowed reserves it needed to supply to hit that desired rate would be constant over time at zero. By contrast, a central bank that set its desired interest rate at another point, such as i' in Exhibit 2, would have re-estimate the demand curve day by day to determine the quantity of reserves it should supply to hit its policy target.
Nonborrowed Reserve Supply
Of course, arranging for the aggregate supply of nonborrowed reserves to equal zero on a daily basis is also a non-trivial task. Autonomous movements of items on the central We briefly explore the role of nonborrowed reserve supply in this model. To develop the aggregate demand for such reserves, we first invert equation [2] :
where F -1 ( ) is the inverse of the distribution function. Then we sum across individual banks, indexed by j:
where the last equality follows for normal distributions of account uncertainties. The ratio of these two types of uncertainties is a key factor in the distribution of the market interest rate in this model:
Exhibit 3 depicts histograms of the distribution of market interest rates under different assumptions for the ratio in [7] . The larger the ratio, the fatter the tails of the resulting distribution of overnight interest rates.
Note: Each graph is based on 10,000 draws of shocks to the central bank's aggregate supply of reserves. 
The Elasticity of Demand
The elasticity of demand is another key issue for policy implementation. In general, if reserve demand is highly elastic, the central bank's job is easy, as errors in assessing reserve demand or in estimating autonomous factors in its own balance sheet would then have little impact on overnight interest rates. By contrast, if the demand for reserves is inelastic, errors in the supply of nonborrowed reserves by the central bank have substantial effects on the overnight market interest rate.
In the model, demand is highly elastic near the ceiling and floor interest rates. Goodfriend (2002) proposed that a central bank could take advantage of the elastic region for interest rates near the central bank's deposit rate by setting the deposit rate equal to its desired market rate and then supplying a sufficient quantity of reserves to drive the market rate to that floor. However, if private rates are sustained at one of the boundaries of the tunnel, trading in the interbank market may dry up, which the central bank might not find desirable.
A key disadvantage of the tunnel model is that the slope of the demand curve is steepest at the central bank's desired interest rate of i* (and it is actually the slope rather than the elasticity per se that matters for the volatility of the overnight rate). In the above setup, for instance, with a symmetric distribution, the demand curve slope peaks at Now suppose that the representative bank, again with no account position uncertainties, is subject to an average reserve requirement of R over a two-day maintenance period, which the bank is compelled to meet. The second day is the reserve "settlement day,"
and the interest rate on that day, denoted by i S , is the only uncertainty as of day one. A risk neutral bank would then fund the entire reserve requirement of 2R on pre-settlement day, if the interest rate on that day, i P , were less than the expected market rate on settlement day,
E(i S ). If instead i P > E(i S )
, the bank would fund the entire requirement the second day.
Thus, the demand curve on day one would be a two-step function as shown on the right in Exhibit 4. Interior solutions on pre-settlement day (with 0 < T P < 2R) would all occur at a market rate equal to the expected settlement day interest rate. This is the martingale property employed within a maintenance period by Bartolini/Bertola/Prati (2002) and others. Thus, 7 Unexpected implicit asymmetries became evident after implementation of a tunnel system by the Bank of Canada. Despite using standing facilities to create an apparently symmetric spread of 25 basis points above and below the target rate, the central bank found it had to provide a positive level of aggregate reserves to achieve its desired market rate. See Woodford (2001) , page 38.
(Demand Curves for Central Bank Balances) With lagged reserve requirements, account shocks that change the private bank's reservable deposits do not affect its reserve requirement within the same period. The level of uncertainty on settlement day is allowed to differ from that on a pre-settlement day, reflecting the empirical results of Hamilton (1996) and others. Note also that in this model, funds borrowed from the central bank to cover an overdraft can be used to meet reserve requirements. With a minimum daily account balance of zero after borrowings, a zero period-average requirement is therefore equivalent to the absence of reserve requirements.
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Consider initially the problem on settlement day, assuming that the private bank has a remaining balance requirement of b. The bank may purchase balances from the market at the settlement day interest rate, i S , and it earns i* -s on required or excess balances held at the central bank. It chooses a target balance T S with the information set:
I s : i*, s, G(ξ), E(ξ) = 0, the settlement day market interest rate, i S , and the remaining required balance as of settlement day, b.
The bank's settlement day cost minimization problem is then:
The first term is the net cost of borrowing from the market to meet the remaining balance requirement, the first integral is the opportunity cost of holding excess balances, and the last integral is the net cost of borrowings from the central bank, rather than the market, to meet To move toward development of the pre-settlement day demand function, note first that:
or in other words, b -
T is independent of b. Thus, we can write the optimal value of b -
T as a function of i S and other parameters: It reflects the expected opportunity cost of being above or below the reserve requirement with information set I S .
In this model, intertemporal arbitrage is limited by the risk of daily account overdrafts. Therefore, the pre-settlement day interest rate, i P , may differ from the expected settlement day rate. The pre-settlement day information set, I p , does not include knowledge of either the remaining balance requirement on settlement day, b, or the settlement day interest rate, i S :
I p : i P , i*, s, F(ε), G(ξ), and E(ε) = E(ξ) = 0.
The value of b is determined after realization of the account shock on pre-settlement day.
With a daily average requirement of R and denoting the end-of-day account balance on presettlement day by T P + ε, the value of b is: and [13] 
0, if T P + ε ≥ 2R.
9 If ξ is normally distributed with mean zero and variance φ 2 , then The first line of [14] is equivalent to [1] . The first term on the second line is the expected net cost, with information set I p , of meeting the period's entire requirement (2R) on settlement day, times the probability of having a negative or zero account balance on day one. The middle term on the second line is the expected net cost of completing the period-average requirement on settlement day if that requirement has been partially met before settlement day. The final term reflects uncertainty under I p about the settlement day interest rate, but it is unaffected by the pre-settlement day decision.
The Euler condition is: i p -i* + s + (e -s)F(-* P T ) -(e+s)F(2R-
If the pre-settlement day market interest rate is at the central bank's desired rate and expected to be there again on settlement day, so that i p = i* and e = 0, this condition simplifies to:
-F(-
and if F is symmetric around the mean of zero, the bank targets the daily average reserve requirement ( 
where a normal distribution is assumed. The first term on the right includes the probability of an overdraft on pre-settlement day; it is close to zero when * P T > 2σ. The final bracket is close to zero when there is a high probability of having a positive remaining requirement on settlement day, which occurs when * P T < 2R -2σ. The highly elastic region thus occurs where:
This line of reasoning could lead to suggestions for a longer maintenance period in order to engender a greater range of high elasticity. For instance, one might think that if the maintenance period were m days instead of two days, the upper limit of the range would be Top left: the solid line assumes E(i ) = i', the dotted line assumes E(i ) = i*.
Top right: the dotted line assumes a 40% larger reserve requirement.
Bottom left: the standard deviation of the account shock is 10% of R for the solid line and 40% of R for the dotted line. | R mR -2σ. However, it is not clear that this particular inequality would characterize the elastic region with a longer reserve maintenance period, as closed-form solutions then become difficult to obtain.
10 One common argument against long maintenance periods is that a number of banks may deliberately run behind on meeting requirements early in the period, expecting interest rates to fall; if these banks run into line limit constraints or other market frictions on settlement day, the volatility of the market rate that day could be more elevated.
Moreover, with longer maintenance periods, arbitrage of expected changes in the central bank's target interest rate would be more frequent, which the central bank may not find desirable.
In sum, this model illustrates the advantages of both a tunnel system and periodaverage requirements. The symmetry of opportunity costs of the tunnel system allows the central bank to know that the aggregate demand for excess reserves on settlement day is zero, irrespective of possible time-varying account uncertainties at private banks. If this advantage is not outweighed by the problem of a steep demand curve at the desired interest rate, combined with imperfect substitutability of market transactions for central bank loans and deposits, the central bank should be aided in achieving its desired interest rate on settlement day. If the market expects that interest rate to be achieved on settlement day, intertemporal arbitrage induced by period-average requirements should help the same interest rate to be realized on pre-settlement days. However, these results occur in a model that abstracts from many details of the relationship of private banks to the central bank. For instance, for many private banks, the non-pecuniary aspects of their relationships to a central bank may loom larger than the explicit penalties for reserve deficiencies and overdrafts. The non-pecuniary considerations may vary across banks and over time for the same bank, making it difficult for the central bank to arrange for the symmetric opportunity costs called for in a tunnel model. T , also depends on 3R-T 1 -ε 1 .
Voluntary Reserve Balance Requirements
In the above model, period-average required balances aid the implementation of monetary policy, but they impose an implicit tax on private banks without conveying any direct benefits to them. The reserve tax could be largely eliminated through the payment of interest on required reserve balances at the market rate of interest. However, despite such interest payments, some banks might prefer to avoid reserve requirements in order to hold assets other than reserve balances. To eliminate completely the inefficiencies associated with reserve avoidance activities, a system of voluntary reserve requirements could be considered.
It is not difficult to imagine an institutional structure in which private banks might obtain some benefit from period-average required balances. A central bank might, for instance, seek to discourage overnight overdrafts by imposing a higher penalty on them than on reserve deficiencies. 11 This penalty structure might reflect true economic costs in that overdrafts may be automatic and potentially unlimited, therefore involving greater risk than discount window loans, which may each require the signature of a central bank official to be approved. 12 With overdrafts more costly than reserve deficiencies, a bank might voluntarily choose to establish a reserve requirement as a precaution against running overdrafts if the opportunity cost of holding reserves were not too high. Below, we explore such a voluntary reserve requirement regime in an analytically convenient, one-day model. The extension to a multi-day framework is a nonlinear simulation exercise.
In this model, the assumptions regarding central bank interest rates are as follows: In a symmetric tunnel version of this model, w = s, but symmetry is irrelevant here when the reserve requirement is positive, as shown below.
We write the bank's expected costs as a function of the reserve requirement, R, with i again the known market rate when the target balance T is chosen:
The first expression is the opportunity cost of holding required reserves and the first integral is the expected opportunity cost on excess reserves. On the second line, the first integral is the expected cost of borrowing from the central bank, rather than the market, to fulfill the reserve requirement, and the last term is the expected supplementary penalty for account overdrafts. The first order condition is:
The response of reserve demand to a higher requirement is:
To determine the bank's optimal choice of a reserve requirement, in principle, the optimal T* 
where T* is also a function of R*, given by [22] , and I u is the unconditional information set. 
using [23] . Now we assume merely that banks expect the market interest rate to equal the central bank's desired rate on average:
Then, note that, if the opportunity cost of holding required reserves were equal to that for excess reserves (v = s), [24] would require F(R* -T*) to equal zero, which would imply an optimal reserve requirement of -∞.
Next, observe that condition [24] can be written in an alternative form by substituting
( )
If there were no average opportunity cost to holding reserves (v = 0) Proof: First note that the second order condition for R* to be a minimum holds: The paper also developed a model that combines a tunnel framework for policy implementation with period-average reserve requirements. Intertemporal arbitrage of expected future interest rates is limited in the model, because private banks subject to account position uncertainties incur penalties for overnight overdrafts. Nevertheless, reserve requirements induce a region of high elasticity of reserve demand on pre-settlement days at the expected interest rate on settlement day. The tunnel framework has a key advantage in such a regime in that the aggregate demand for excess reserves on settlement day equals zero, irrespective of the degree of account uncertainties perceived by private banks. Again, this advantage could be impaired by imperfect substitution of interbank loans for central bank loans and deposits.
While reserve requirements may be beneficial for the implementation of monetary policy, they have also been associated with financial market inefficiencies owing to the reserve avoidance activities of banks, and it may not be possible to rationalize such outcomes on the grounds of optimal taxation. One way of addressing the trade-off between the policy implementation benefits and the efficiency costs of reserve requirements would be for a central bank to pay a market rate of interest on required reserve balances. Another possible solution would be a system of voluntary reserve requirements. Elimination of compulsory reserve requirements likely would remove the incentives for reserve avoidance more completely than would the payment of interest on required balances. In the final model developed here, banks optimally choose to establish a reserve requirement in a tunnel regime in which the cost of overdrafts exceeds the cost of other borrowings from the central bank.
This cost structure may reflect optimal pricing if overdrafts are riskier than other loans.
The paper pointed out the sensitivity of model results to some of the many complexities in the structure of the relationships of private commercial banks to the central bank. Changes in the parameters of such relationships, such as penalties for overdrafts and reserve deficiencies, non-pecuniary costs, collateralization policies, credit risk premia, the ability to use overdrafts to satisfy reserve requirements, the timing of central bank interventions in the market, and the availability of information regarding account positions may have significant effects on the structure and performance of any policy implementation regime. Moreover, the number and heterogeneity of institutions having accounts at the central bank and the market frictions arising from line limits or transaction costs may also importantly condition the functioning of the regime. The theoretical models presented in this paper are too stylized to be the basis for general recommendations appropriate for all central banks. Rather, they are intended to explore further a central bank's opportunity set regarding frameworks for the implementation of policy and, with other similar papers, could be used to stimulate additional work that takes account of more specialized institutional features of the policy implementation environment affecting individual central banks.
